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The Europeanization of Labour: Structure before Action 
Lowell Turner 
 
At national level, the development of effective labour movements has involved the interaction of two 
processes: the establishment of formal organizational structures, and the rise of rank-and-file pressure 
and protest. At European level, recent years have seen significant organizational developments; this 
article discusses the role of the European Trade Union Confederation and the emergent European Works 
Councils. As yet, however, there has been no parallel evidence of transnational labour protest, and 
indeed the obstacles are considerable. Nevertheless, institutional frameworks may create a 'political 
opportunity structure' which facilitates its emergence. 
 
Vignette: Popular Passion in Rostock 
2 April 1993i. From a makeshift stage blocking the street in front of the shipyards in the 
northern port city of Rostock, union leaders harangued a crowd of 5000. These were 'warning 
strikers', courageous men and women who, in circumstances of mass unemployment (40 
percent or more in real terms), had walked off the job that day and marched in columns of 
protest from workplaces throughout the city. For most of them this was the first time they 
could take such action without facing the threat of Red Army intervention. In an unexpected 
show of solidarity, they protested at the unilateral decision of metal industry employers to 
rescind a scheduled pay rise. News reports later in the day would show this to be one wave in a 
swelling tide of over 100,000 eastern German warning strikers, who within a month would 
stage a determined, high-risk, and ultimately successful 2-week strike in the pattern-setting 
metal and electronics industries of the new German Lander. In eastern Germany the 
organization of labour had passed in a few short years from 'transmission-belt' communist-led 
unions, via a tentative but enthusiastic mass membership in the new incoming western unions, 
to a remarkable and well-organized mass movement that dominated German headlines over a 
2-month period. 
After IG Metall leaders finished militant speeches to roars of approval, a spokesman of 
the DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, German trade union confederation) rose to recount 
tales of international labour activity. On that very day, he reported, Italian unions were out on a 
1-day general strike in protest at government policy, thousands of workers were on strike in the 
UK, and additional thousands called out in Maastricht by the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) rallied for jobs and other labour-supported demands within the single 
European market. Although the litany of simultaneous European labour demonstrations was 
impressive, few of the Rostock warning strikers showed interest. Italy, Britain, the Netherlands 
seemed distant from the day's exciting and immediate concerns. The crowd waited politely for 
the DGB speaker to bring the focus back home. 
As a spectator/participant, I found it remarkable to hear European labour solidarity 
highlighted as a prominent theme at a union-led rally in eastern Germany. Crowd behaviour, 
however, demonstrated two juxtaposed realities for labour in contemporary Europe. On the 
one hand, in the face of widespread gloomy predictions of its demise, labour is alive, still strong 
in its potential expression as a movement - certainly in unified Germany where bargaining 
structures are comprehensive and effective. On the other hand, however, at a time of 
economic globalization when cross-national labour linkages appear both appropriate and 
necessary, there is as yet little popular interest in such international solidarity. This is true even 
in the 1990s in Europe, where cross-national union collaboration has progressed farther than 
anywhere else. 
It is commonplace to assert that social movements give rise to new structures of 
representation, which may consolidate some of the gains made and then live on after the 
movements subside. In the worst case, such structures may finally become lifeless, distant from 
the rank and file, unrepresentative, overly bureaucratic, and even repressive. There is, 
however, another possibility: that new structures may offer channels within which movements 
of popular protest can take shape, to grow, expand, and make concrete gains. This is precisely 
what happened in 
Rostock (and throughout eastern Germany in the years after 1989); it is perhaps not beyond the 
realm of possibility that a similar phenomenon could happen cross-nationally in Europe in the 
years ahead. 
 
The Europeanization of Labour: Institutions Precede Mass Action 
 
The lines of causality for institutions of representation in modern democracies run in 
many cases from popular protest to structure. Aggrieved social groups, such as the car workers 
in Flint, Michigan in 1937, or the black refuse workers in Memphis, Tennessee in 1968, rise up 
in semi-spontaneous mass protest that galvanizes community- and workplace-based struggle. 
Commonly, such protests occur as part of broader 'cycles of protest' (Tarrow, 1990): for the 
above examples, the mass upsurge of unorganized industrial workers in the 1930s and the civil 
rights movement of the 1960s. If successful (that is, if not fully repressed or dissipated), such 
movements may result in the establishment of new rights for the aggrieved along with 
mechanisms and institutions to promote and sustain those rights. Thus, in the above examples, 
both the Flint workers and the Memphis drivers secured union recognition and collective 
bargaining rights, ensuring rising wages and stabilizing a system of representation that made 
future mass protest less likely. 
Organized labour and its structures of representation, therefore, offer many examples 
of a widespread causal process: social movements give rise to organization and 
institutionalizationii.  In general, these processes occur at national and subnational levelsiii. In 
the international arena, however, cross-national collaboration (among labour, peace or 
environmental groups, for example), rather than being movement-driven, develops through 
networking and further institution-building on the part of representatives of already 
established organizations (which themselves were the earlier products of social movements). In 
these cases, new structures of representation may develop either prior to or in the absence of 
mass mobilization. It is difficult to imagine, however, that in the long run such structures could 
be effective - in other words, that the actors could acquire real power - in the absence of mass 
protest. Two scenarios thus appear possible: that such cross-national collaboration will amount 
to little in its ability to influence the policy of either national or supranational agencies; or that 
such cross-national collaboration will acquire meaningful influence if and when it is bolstered 
by mass protest. 
This is the dilemma facing current efforts on the part of numerous actors to 
'Europeanize' labouriv. The building of the ETUC, the 1989 Social Charter of the European 
Community and the 1991 Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty (based in part on the 
compromise between ETUC and its employer counterpart UNICE which opened the possibility 
of European-level framework agreements), recent legislation to require European works 
councils (EWCs) in large multinational firms - all of these impressive efforts reflect the building 
of new cross-national structures of representation by established representatives of national 
and supranational labour organizations, in the absence of mass popular demands or protestv. 
The preceding discussion is based on the notion that there are two overlapping but 
conceptually distinct aspects of a labour movement: mass protest (or at least its credible threat, 
as in a strike threat) and structures of representation. Historically, both appear necessary to the 
consolidation and maintenance of labour movement influence both in politics and in the 
economy. The Europeanization of labour, however, is characterized by only one of these: 
institution-building, so far largely in the absence of mass protest. 
Conceptually, I argue that in spite of widespread scepticism on the part of observers and 
participants alike, there is in fact a European labour movement, more so today than there has 
ever beenvi. Evidence is presented below to substantiate this claim. This developing labour 
movement, however, is based on networks of contacts and new structures of international 
representation; it is not based on or empowered by mass pressure or protest. Analytically, I 
argue that these developing networks and structures, that together define the European labour 
movement today, are a product of politics and strategy - on the part of both national and 
supranational actors (national union leaders, officials of the European Commission, institution-
builders at the ETUC) - in a context of growing economic integration in Europe. The implications 
of this argument are the following: unless the new structures can open space for cross-national 
collective action or mass protest, the European labour movement is likely to remain a rather 
formal construct, stunted by its distance from mass action, limited in its power and influence 
within the European Union; and this is true even where European labour has had some 
influence: in the social dimension of new international regulation (Hall, 1994). 
 
The Evidence: Building Labour’s European Superstructure 
 
Beyond defending national rules and institutions at home, perhaps the best thing that 
unions can do in response to growing economic integration is to build a cross-national labour 
movement (see, for example, Platzer, 1991; Altvater and Mahnkopf, 1993; Lecher, 1993; 
Hyman, 1995). Although progress has been slow, labour in Europe is farther along in this effort 
than are unions in any other region of the globe (Visser, 1996: 192). The biggest obstacle to the 
Europeanization of labour is closely related to the imperative to defend national bases: the 
contrasting interests and structures found among widely diverse national unions (Timmersfeld, 
1992; Visser and Ebbinghaus, 1992). For this reason, cross-national labour collaboration and 
organization will undoubtedly take shape in unforeseeable ways that differ substantially from 
national forms of organization. 
Efforts at building a European labour movement are nonetheless real and can be seen 
both in formal structures, such as the ETUC, sectoral European Industry Committees (EICs), and 
the EWCs, and in growing informal networks of cross-national information exchange and 
collaboration. Below we consider evidence concerning the development of the two most 
prominent of these efforts: the ETUC, based in Brussels, and the recent drive to establish EWCs 
in large European multinational firmsvii. 
 
 
The European Trade Union Confederation 
 
The ETUC is an inclusive confederation of western European trade union federations, 
from countries within and without the EU. Also affiliated are the fourteen sectoral EICs. 
Founded in 1973 and based in Brussels, the ETUC has a long history of lobbying at European 
Community offices over a variety of social issues: from gender equality, protection for workers 
in cases of plant closure, and health and safety in the workplace in the 1970s, to the broader 
provisions of the Social Charter and action programme in the late 1980s and 1990s, to a more 
recent focus on jobs and macroeconomic policyviii. A growing organization with a staff of about 
45 in 1995, ETUC anticipates future revenue increases and growing influence in Brussels, and 
has recently moved into a new headquarters building shared with the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). 
With only one remaining exception, all major labour (con)federations in western Europe 
are now members of the ETUC. With the Spanish and Portuguese communist union federations 
finally in (reflecting among other things the end of the Cold War), the French communist 
Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT, still generally considered the largest union 
confederation in France) is now the last remaining holdout (or exclusion, depending on the 
interpretation). Although the CGT campaigned to good electoral effect against 'Europe' in the 
September 1992 Maastricht referendum in France, many well-placed observers are predicting 
CGT membership in ETUC soon, for two reasons: first, with the Cold War over and all other 
prominent communist (and former communist) union confederations in western Europe now in 
the ETUC, it is only a matter of time before CGT leadership softens its line and their opponents 
in the ETUC (principally its French rivals CFDT and FO) give up their resistance; and second, the 
Maastricht social protocol will accelerate the pace of the 'social dialogue' between ETUC, UNICE 
and CEEP (the European confederation of public-sector employers), giving the CGT added 
incentive to be on the inside where it can influence bargaining demands. 
In any event, membership is one thing but active participation and organizational 
commitment are another. ETUC faces a number of intransigent organizational problems. By its 
very nature, it is limited in what it can do as a confederation of (con)federations. Many of its 
prominent members, including the German DGB and the British TUC, are umbrella 
organizations at home that do not in themselves possess bargaining power. The ETUC is thus a 
long way from many of the real sources of industrial relations clout. 
Beyond this organizational limitation, ETUC suffers from a widely diverse membership, 
not only in national origin but in structure (ETUC includes centralized and decentralized 
(con)federations; those that are inclusive at the national level and those that contend with 
others for representation and membership; those whose member unions engage in 
autonomous collective bargaining and those used to a strong state involvement). There are also 
evident internal differences of interest (such as between unions from low-wage and from high-
wage countries). Diversity of interests has led Timmersfeld (1992) to predict, from a study of 
member positions and coalitions on key issues, an insurmountable problem of collective action 
for the ETUC; while Lange (1992) predicts a 'fragmentation of interests' in debates over the 
social dimension, instead of a stable, class-based coalition around which the ETUC could 
coalesce as an organization. Visser and Ebbinghaus (1992: 222) have aptly described the ETUC 
as 'united but fragmented and with little internal cohesion'ix. 
National unions and federations, however, have surprised observers in the past by their 
ability, at certain times and places, to overcome great internal diversity to build cohesive 
organizations (by various means ranging from side payments to exceptional leadership to 
dramatic, defining actions such as strikes or participation in new political alliances). Diversity of 
structure and interest are obstacles that may well be surmountable if and when the 
commitment of actors to cross-national collaboration, based on other common interests, 
becomes substantial. 
A number of national federations are frequently cited as the most committed at the 
European level; often mentioned, for example, are the Dutch, Belgians, Italians and, lately, the 
British. But even for these federations, the European commitment is typically expressed by the 
engagement of a few key players. Even in these best cases, it is questionable how much real 
commitment to European unionism exists among the broader ranks of national union 
leadership, let alone among the rank and file. Unless leaders and members can see tangible 
benefits, there is little incentive to focus beyond the plant, firm, or at most sectoral or national 
levels. This does not mean that key Europe-oriented national union leaders could not possibly 
bring along the troops at some future critical moment; but it does mean that the commitment 
to the ETUC of even the most committed rests on shaky national foundations until 
demonstrated otherwise. 
If even the committed are not as committed as they appear, restricted German union 
engagement has been glaring and quite problematic for the future vitality and influence of the 
ETUC. On paper, things look fine. The DGB, by virtue of its size and relative wealth, is the largest 
financial contributor to the ETUC (about DM lm per year). German unions are active in the 
sectoral EICs, which as a result of organizational reform in 1991 now all have seats on the ETUC 
executive board. Because of its size, wealth, and relative success at home, the DGB arguably 
speaks with the most influential voice within the councils of the ETUC (Markovits and Otto, 
1991). Participants claim, in fact, that the DGB is the only member with de facto veto rights in 
ETUC decision-making on issues of importance (although this is officially denied). 
In spite of appearances, however, many participants (inside and outside the ETUC, 
including European-oriented German trade unionists) claim that as regards active participation, 
energy and commitment, German unions have been the critical missing player. Some maintain 
that German unions have never been very active beyond the above appearances, tacit veto 
power, and financial support. An often cited illustration of weak commitment is the fact that 
Franz Steinkuhler, former president of IG Metall, had a seat on the ETUC executive board for 
many years as a member of the DGB delegation but never once attended a meetingx. Others 
claim that German union presence effectively vanished when the life-threatening problems of 
unification began in 1990. In either case, it is clear that an ETUC team without the enthusiastic 
participation of its most prominent members is not likely to contend for great influence within 
the EUxi. 
It is important to reiterate here the key role of the Franco-German alliance at the core 
of the EU. French officials with past links to the CFDT are scattered throughout the Commission 
(Jacques Delors, Commission President from 1984 to 1994, was a long-time CFDT ally) and have 
maintained close ties to their compatriots at the ETUC, where the CFDT also plays an active 
role. But again, the largest French labour federation, the CGT, remains outside the fold, 
completely absent at ETUC levelxii. 
As if organizational problems of membership diversity and commitment were not 
enough, the ETUC faces a very practical external problem in its attempt to negotiate even the 
most modest non-wage framework agreements on specific, limited issues at European level: its 
principal counterpart, UNICE, has neither the interest nor the mandate to bargain. UNICE is a 
confederation of private-sector employers' associations from across western Europe, whose 
primary social dimension concern in Brussels is to prevent the passage of any binding legislation 
that will restrict employer discretion. UNICE will bargain with ETUC to produce nonbinding joint 
opinions or to delay or water down any possible Commission directives; but UNICE has little 
interest in negotiating substantive outcomes with ETUC, nor does UNICE possess any mandate 
from its diverse membership to engage in collective bargaining. In the substantive meaning of 
the term, ETUC is a prospective social partner without a suitorxiii. 
Given the above organizational and political problems, it is remarkable that the ETUC 
has played any role at all. External support has been crucial. Martin and Ross (1992) are surely 
right in their central argument: that supranational institutions of the EU, in particular the 
Commission, have played a critical, independent role in opening up space and facilitating the 
development of cross-national union collaboration (see also Jensen et al., 1995). This has 
enabled the ETUC to develop a range of activities and influence that would be considerably 
diminished without the Commission's political and financial support. It finances the European 
Trade Union Institute (in practice, ETUC's research arm) and the promising new Trade Union 
College, along with a plethora of meetings and activities that the ETUC undertakes as a 
designated social partner. Meetings with UNICE, for example, are facilitated and subsidized by 
the Commission, and the ETUC has in turn acted as a conduit for Commission funding for pilot 
meetings of prospective EWCs. Cross-national meetings typically involve heavy travel and 
translation costs, which are often covered by EU funds. Most important, perhaps, the 
Commission has designated the ETUC as the representative social partner for European 
employees, affording the ETUC stature in Brussels and drawing it into countless discussions, 
negotiations and dialogue' concerning social policy initiativesxiv. 
For a confederation of federations with so many demonstrable weaknesses, ETUC has 
had impact at the EU-level worth noticing. It led the campaign for the Social Charter (1988-9) 
and its subsequent partial implementation in the action programme (1990-3), the social 
protocol of the Maastricht Treaty (1991), and the continuing passage of binding social directives 
such as the 1994 legislation on EWCs. We cannot yet say that it has sparked, or reflects, the 
building of a truly European labour movement. The mere existence of these channels of 
communication and organization, however, along with the ETUC's entrenched position within 
the councils of the EU in Brussels, provide a useful institutional framework for early efforts at 
cross-national union collaboration (Ross, 1994). 
 
European Works Councils 
 
 Along with post-Social Charter debates on employee participation legislation and the 
recent wave of voluntarily established EWCs has come a new literature on the meaning and 
importance of this issue (e.g. Northrup et a l , 1988; Martin and Ross, 1992; Streeck and Vitols, 
1993; Turner, 1993; Hall, 1994; Mertens, 1994). The Social Charter calls for employee rights to 
'information, consultation and participation'. But the issue goes back to the 1970s, when 
workers and unions found national rights (where they existed) to information and consultation 
increasingly undermined as business went international. Early attempts to legislate such rights 
for all employees of large firms in the European Community culminated in an intense battle 
over the draft Vredeling Directive in the early 1980s. Although labour lost this battle against the 
combined opposition of European and American business and UK Prime Minister Thatcher's 
veto power, the issue reappeared in the Charter as a key element of the social dimension. 
Once again, the British veto and united employer opposition prevented adoption of 
legislation on employee rights to information, consultation and participation which the action 
programme envisaged. Although employers face very different national rules on this issue in 
different countries (ranging from detailed codetermination rights for elected works councils in 
Germany to no legislated or broadly bargained rights at all in the UK), they nonetheless united 
in opposing EC legislation. While German employers, for example, may like their system at 
home for its contribution to workforce stability, training, high productivity and cooperation 
(Wever, 1995), they want the right to do business as they see fit in other countries. While 
UNICE endorses principles of information-sharing and employee participation (as stated in the 
Charter), it has consistently opposed binding legislation. Business on the whole favours 
employer-led participation (quality circles, employer-dominated information-sharing, profit-
sharing and the like, especially at plant level) as opposed to negotiated participation (based on 
employee rights, up to and including participation at the strategic level; Turner, 1993). For 
these reasons, progress was stalled until 1994, when the Maastricht social protocol allowed the 
other Member States to act without the UK (thus escaping the British veto) and also introduced 
qualified majority voting on the issue of information and consultation rights. This finally 
enabled the long-term campaign of the ETUC (supported by DG V) to succeedxv. 
Although lacking veto rights in management decision-making (which German works 
councils to some degree possess), information and perhaps even consultation committees, to 
be phased in through company-level negotiations, will now become standard practice at large 
European firmsxvi. Wolfgang Streeck's much-feared 'supranational neo-voluntarism' (Streeck, 
1994) has given way surprisingly quickly to mandatory supranational institution-building. 
In the meantime the ETUC, EICs, and national unions, with the support of DG V, have 
made a major effort since 1991 to establish forerunner EWCs in about a hundred large 
European firms. The Commission, for example, provided ECU 14m in 1992 and 17m in 1993 to 
finance the first rounds of meetingsxvii. 
Although a special case that is not yet generalizable, the EWC at Volkswagen (VW), for 
example, is widely regarded in labour circles as worthy of emulation. The original initiative for 
its establishment of a Euro-works council at VW came from the company's general works 
council (Gesamtbetriebsrat) in Wolfsburg. This body is made up of representatives from six VW 
plants in Germany; all of whom belong to IG Metall. The German Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 
(Works Constitution Act) provides not only for works councils at all workplaces of five or more 
employees, but for general works councils at firms with more than one plant. In addition, the 
law provides for 'conglomerate' works councils (Konzernbetriebsrdte) for firms that include 
more than one independent subsidiary. The VW EWC was established under this latter 
provision at a meeting of works council representatives in August 1990, and consisted of eight 
representatives from VW in western Germany and two from Audi, five from SEAT in Spain and 
two from VW in Belgiumxviii.The council planned eventually to bring in representatives from 
VW-owned plants in Sachsen, the Czech Republic and Slovakia - and by 1995 had done so. 
The general works council promoted this EWC for a number of reasons: a desire to exert 
greater influence on VW's growing internationalization of production within Europe; concerns 
about social dumping, meaning the danger of increased VW investment in countries with lower 
wages and labour standards at the expense of investment in Germany; a desire to work with 
Spanish and Czechoslovak colleagues to help raise wages and labour standards in those 
countries; and disappointment with progress at EC level on legislating for works councils in 
European firms. The conscious intent of activists on the new VW EWC was not only to receive 
information and begin to negotiate jointly with VW management across Europe, but to use 
German law to set an example for the spread of EWCs at other firms. 
VW management has taken a 'friendly' attitude toward the new EWC and was present at 
the founding meeting; and in February 1992, it formally recognized the council and its right to 
meet at company expense, receive information, and discuss issues of strategic importance with 
management (consultation rights). Leaders of the council expected such recognition and 
contractual legitimation from the start, if only because VW management places a high premium 
on cooperative relations with its already established works councils, especially in Germany, and 
because VW is in part a publicly owned firm that responds to pressure from the SPD-controlled 
state government of Niedersachsen (where the firm has its headquarters). 
Even prior to formal recognition, works councillors already claimed important 
accomplishments. First, they set up a viable cross-national labour body that met regularly and 
laid the groundwork for an official role at Europe's largest motor vehicle firm. Second, they 
exchanged information among union and works council representatives from several countries 
and set in motion a regularized exchange and cooperation process to inform national and plant 
bargaining (Fuchs et ah, 1991; Mertens, 1994). Third, cross-national information exchange paid 
early dividends in bargaining outcomes: discussions at the EWC of a shorter work week in Spain 
were followed by concrete bargaining gains in this regard at SEATxix. And finally, the council 
quickly achieved recognition, especially in union circles, as an attractive model for the spread of 
EWCs at European multinational firms. 
The EWC at VW is clearly a special case, based as it is on German law, a powerful 
German works council and union, partial public ownership of the firm, and a tradition of labour-
management partnership within the company. Yet this case is important in setting a standard of 
what is possible, stimulating strategies by others to strive for similar gains. For the present, 
similarly strong cases (exceeding the mandate of recent EU legislation on EWCs) appear 
possible only where national law in the firm's home country supports such employee rights (as 
in Germany), and where an already existing and strong works council, with union backing, 
mobilizes for this kind of institution-building. Even in Germany, however, more typical in the 
early 1990s were the cases of GM-Europe (including Opel) and DECxx. 
At GM-Europe, plant representatives from across Europe met in 1992, with Commission 
funding, to organize an EWC. Although GM-Europe moved its headquarters from Germany to 
Switzerland in the 1980s, Opel remains the dominant member of this family and operates 
under German law with strong works councils organized by IG Metall and a supervisory board 
with significant workforce representation. IG Metall works councillors from the flagship 
Russelsheim plant played a leading role in setting up the meeting, intending to follow the VW 
model. However, Louis Hughes, the participatory-minded president of GM-Europe (and former 
president of Opel), attended the meeting, listened to the discussion and arguments in favour of 
an EWC, and then simply announced that GM-Europe would not recognize the body, provide 
information, or pay future costs. Participation, he maintained, is fine on the shop-floor and in 
the plants, but not at an additional and expensive bureaucratic Euro-level far from the rank and 
file. 
In 1994, however, workforce representatives from Opel and other GMEurope plants 
followed VW's lead to establish a conglomerate works council and demand new negotiations 
for establishment of an EWCxxi. With the passage of the new EU directive, management revised 
its position and agreed to negotiate. In 1995, discussions stalled over the conflict between GM's 
demand that elected representatives be employees of the company and union demands that 
full-time union officials also be eligible to run for the council positions. In November, the 
company finally gave in, clearing the way for the establishment of GM's new EWC (Economist, 2 
December 1995: 73). 
Management's response at Digital Equipment Corporation was similar to that at GM-
Europe. DEC plant and union representatives from ten countries met twice, in 1991 and 1992, 
with EC funding. Although the company refused to recognize this would-be EWC, the workforce 
representatives themselves decided to establish a permanent body for the purpose of 
information exchange. At their second meeting in 1992, they elected a Euro-works council and 
set up a number of working groups (to discuss such issues as layoff rules, health and safety 
protection in computer work, company strategies such as outsourcing, and pension funds). 
Although costs were a problem, these were manageable given the nature of the DEC 
representatives: they tended to be professional and technical, speak English (reducing the need 
for translation), and could exchange information rapidly by electronic means. By 1993, they 
claimed to have an effective network that had already enhanced bargaining capacities for 
particular cases in Germany and Belgium. When in 1995, responding to the new legislation, the 
company proposed a minimalist 'electronic' EWC that fell far short of the demands of employee 
representatives, the latter held firm in rejecting management plansxxii. 
EWC enthusiasts at DEC, in fact, viewed their unrecognized body as accomplishing the 
main positive function foreseen for EWCs in European firms: the exchange of information and 
the building of a cross-national network of plant activists. They argued that this outcome was in 
fact better than some officially recognized EWCs for which management paid the costs but also 
dominated the meetings, allowing little time for plant and union representatives to meet 
without management being present. At Moulinex, for example, a French company that bought 
the German firm Krups, EWC meetings followed the French works committee model, resulting 
in the development of less cross-national exchange and networking than in the 'unofficial' DEC 
case. 
Streeck and Vitols (1993) were probably right that EWCs, prior to the passage of the 
1994 legislation, had only been established where a national government promoted this (as at 
French firms such as Bull and Thomson) or where a strong national union with participation 
rights in national legislation took the initiative (as at VW). They also assumed, however, that 
such bodies were not forerunners of legislated EWCs throughout the EU but rather the end of a 
neo-voluntarist line, in which market forces burst free of national regulation. This does not 
appear at all a foregone conclusion, especially now that Euro-legislation requiring at least 
crossnational information committees (in firms with 1000 or more employees with plants of at 
least 150 employees in two or more Member States) has been officially adopted. Certainly the 
activists involved in building both officially recognized and unoffical EWC networks have seen 
themselves as early participants in something bigger than supranational neo-voluntarism - and 
as it turned out they were right (Goetschy, 1994). Whether these new bodies of cross-national 
representation prove significant (as opposed to serving merely as window-dressing for a very 
limited social dimension) depends on quite unpredictable developments, including 
implementation of the new EU legislation, future social partner negotiations in Brussels, and 
the effects of network-spreading and nascent informally coordinated cross-national collective 
bargaining. 
 
Prospects for Expanding Cross-National Collaboration 
 
There is, therefore, now solidly in place a 'superstructure' for European cross-national 
labour movement collaboration. The institutional framework and the networks of exchange are 
densest in western Europe, within the EU. In addition, however, western trade unions, including 
the umbrella ETUC, have been active in eastern and central Europe since 1989, promoting the 
development of independent trade unionism and laying the groundwork for new future 
memberships as the European market expands eastward (Seideneck, 1993). 
Prospects appear bright for the continuing expansion of such institutional arrangements 
and regularized contacts, both among union officials (e.g. within ETUC) and among elected 
workforce representatives (e.g. within company-level EWCs). As the European market 
continues to develop internally, there is more and more incentive for unions and other 
workforce representatives to collaborate (from information exchange to the coordination of 
bargaining demands and the mobilization of pressure on firms and governments). Although 
barriers of diversity among national unions in structure, interest and ideology remain 
important, other prominent barriers to greater cooperation appear likely to fall away, in 
particular the problematic Franco-German union commitment cited above. The French CGT, 
long excluded on ideological grounds, now appears set to move toward membership of the 
ETUC. And the powerful German unions, having achieved favourable settlements in the 1990s 
in the face of a renewed employer offensive at home (in the pattern-setting metal industry in 
eastern Germany in 1993 and in western Germany in 1994 and 1995), look to have stabilized 
their domestic position in unified Germany and may well be ready to engage more actively in 
the European arena. 
If a European labour movement requires both structure and collective action, the 
former at least appears to be developing steadily. Institutions - such as the EWCs and the ETUC 
considered above - are growing in influence, comprehensiveness, and legitimacy. Most 
importantly, perhaps, these structures encourage a thickening web of cross-national union 
contacts, at firm, sectoral, and macro levels. Such contacts offer at least the possibility of 
growing labour networks that could underpin future cross-national labour collaboration, 
ranging from information exchange to mass action. 
What is missing in the presentation of evidence here is precisely the latter: cases of 
cross-national mass action on the part of labour. For the most part, these simply do not yet 
exist. The emphasis in this article has been on structures of representation because that is 
where the action lies so far in the Europeanization of labour. 
 
Conclusion: From Structure to Action? 
 
Sidney Tarrow (1996) suggests that the most likely form of Europeanization for social 
movements may lie in national protest against European-level (EU) policy and its consequences. 
This is a sensible perspective: one can more easily imagine nationally-based labour protests 
against specific EU policies (German labour protest, for example, against EU policy that allows a 
Spanish or Portuguese construction firm operating in Germany to pay sub-German wage levels 
to its imported Spanish or Portuguese workers) than one can imagine European-wide labour 
protest against a common target (be it a corporation, business association, or EU policy). The 
explosive French strike wave of December 1995, aimed at government austerity policies in 
preparation for economic and monetary union (EMU), offers dramatic evidence in support of 
Tarrow's contention. 
For this reason, the strategies of the actors, along with the political interaction and 
negotiation between different actors, appear to offer the most persuasive explanation for 
developing structures of cross-national collaboration. To a significant degree, actors engaged in 
the building of such bodies as the ETUC and EWCs are working against the prevailing tide. 
Market developments, the effects of increasing economic integration within Europe, push both 
ways: towards collaboration, to meet multinational firms and supranational agencies on the 
new international terrain; but also towards the sort of national protest which Tarrow highlights, 
against the increasingly strong (and for the losers potentially devastating) effects of the 
internationalization of markets. As for 'spillover', there does not appear to be any necessary 
logic at work within the expansion of EU responsibility that pushes toward cross-national labour 
collaboration; again, the opposite effect appears just as likely, especially given great diversity in 
structure, interest and ideology among national labour movements (Jensen et al., 1995). 
Indeed, well-informed observers have long argued that the ETUC would accomplish little 
(Timmersfeld, 1992) and the EWC would amount to no more than 'neo-voluntarism' (Streeck 
and Vitols, 1993). To the extent that such predictions have already been confounded, this 
reflects the uncertain outcomes of politics and the capacity of determined actors to 
collaborate, overcoming both institutional barriers and the deregulatory effects of market 
integration. 
While Tarrow's scenario implies the rise of mass protest in part against structures of 
cross-national collaboration, an alternative scenario also exists for European labour. The new 
structures examined in this article have been fought for and painstakingly developed on the 
part of both national and supranational actors. Is it possible that if such structures continue to 
develop, they could in time open up space (creating a 'political opportunity structure') for mass 
protests to move into channels of collaboration among European-minded activists and 
movementsxxiii? Next to the proletarian internationalism predicted by Marx, such cross-national 
labour protest and collaboration - aimed only at the regulation of an increasingly competitive 
and international capitalist market economy - may seem quite tame. From this perspective, the 
ETUC and EWCs are mild indeed. Reinforced in time by mass protest, however, such nascent 
structures may well bolster the contemporary social-democratic mission in the post-Cold War 
world: to bring a measure of justice and regulation to the no longer fundamentally challenged 
market economy. 
 
Notes 
 
An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the European 
Community Studies Association, 11-14 May 1995, Charleston, South Carolina. For helpful 
comments and advice, the author thanks Peter Coldrick, Jon Erik D0lvik, David Foden, Gary 
Herrigel, Richard Hyman, Richard Locke, Gary Marks, Paul Pierson, Harvie Ramsay, Sidney 
Tarrow, Kathleen Thelen, John Windmuller and two anonymous reviewers for the journal. 
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i This section is based largely on my own participant observation in the events described. For press accounts of the 
2 April warning strikes in Rostock, see 'Werftarbeiter im Warnstreik', Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 April 1993: 1,3; 
'Warnstreik am Werftdreieck', Hansestadt Rostock, 3 April 1993: 13; and '20,000 auf der Strasse', Ostsee Zeitung, 3 
April 1993: 1-2. 
ii This is not to say that mass protest and/or a broader social movement are necessary conditions for the 
consolidation of enduring labour organization. In British and American labour histories, for example, craft unionism 
based on a monopolization of skills provided the most stable basis for lasting labour organization in the early 
decades of the TUC in Britain and AFL in the USA - although such craft unions rarely extended beyond a relatively 
privileged core of skilled white male workers. 
iii For a general argument along these lines derived from a historical analysis of strikes, see Shorter and Tilly, who 
persuasively make the following argument: 'largely as a result of their own collective action . . . , organized groups 
of workers acquire places in the national structure of power' (1974: 8). 
iv Note Richard Hyman's impassioned plea (1995) for the building of a crossnational European labour movement in 
the inaugural issue of the journal. 
v On the ETUC, see Barnouin (1986), Gorges (1992) and Martin and Ross (1992). On the Social Charter, see Silvia 
(1991) and Turner (1993). On the Maastricht Treaty social protocol, see Hall (1994), Lange (1992), Ramsay (1995), 
Turner (1996) and Weiss (1992). On EWCs, see Northrup et al. (1988), Streeck and Vitols (1993); and European 
Industrial Relations Review 
251, December 1994: 27-32 and 256, May 1995: 14-22. 
vi For useful historical perspectives that also assess contemporary problems and prospects, see Ramsay (1995) and 
Visser (1996). For a lucid analysis of European integration's pressure on domestic unions (driving them to 
international collaboration) see Streeck (1991). 
vii Earlier versions of the empirical sections on ETUC and EWCs appear in Turner (1996). On EIC history, see 
Windmuller (1980). 
viii It is beyond the scope of this study to present details of the ETUC's history, organization, and proto-negotiations 
with its employer counterparts; for this the reader is referred to sources such as Barnouin (1986), Gorges (1992), 
Martin and Ross (1992), Silvia (1991), Visser and Ebbinghaus (1992) and Teague and Grahl (1990). 
ix See also Jensen et al. (1995). 
x But see Steinkuhler (1989) for a strong statement endorsing German union activism and cross-national union 
collaboration at European level. 
xi Another reason cited for German unions' lack of interest in Europeanization is the central importance of the 
German economy within the EU (Hoffmann, 1995:111-12). 
xii It is, of course, possible to imagine active cross-national union collaboration within the EU in which French labour 
does not play a central role. Because of the centrality for the EU of the Franco-German alliance, however, 
policymakers at the Council, Commission and Parliament look for Franco-German agreement on which to base 
enforceable decisions - and this logic extends to the ETUC and to UNICE as well. In any case, the CFDT is well 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
ensconced in cross-national union efforts within the EU; other non-French actors regret the absence of the CGT, an 
absence that reflects the only partial involvement of the French labour movement. 
xiii To date the one substantive agreement reached with UNICE (though there have been several with CEEP) has 
been that on parental leave in December 1995; whatever its symbolic significance, this is so modest in its 
provisions that it will have minimal practical impact. Attempting to be a social partner when the other partner 
does not want to play is difficult even for the strongest of labour federations, as Swedish unions have learned in 
recent years. And since historically, union consolidation may to some extent be employer-driven (on the Swedish 
case, see Swenson, 1991), UNICE's position does not bode well for the expansion of ETUC's role and authority. 
xiv See, for example, European Industrial Relations Review 244, May 1994: 25-32. The Commission's approach 
reflects the view of many EU governments that continuing economic and political integration in Europe requires a 
social dimension to sustain popular support. To establish EU-wide labour and social standards requires active 
lobbying and mobilization from key players such as the ETUC. This was certainly the view of past Commission 
President Jacques Delors and officials of DG V (the Directorate-General for Social Affairs), who have made an active 
effort to bring ETUC aboard. 
xv The UK opt-out reduces the number of British-owned companies covered by the Directive, and makes possible 
the exclusion of British employees from representation on EWCs. But not only have many UK firms already 
established voluntary EWCs (United Biscuits was an early prominent example); almost without exception, 
companies which have agreed EWCs for their continental European workforces have included their British 
employees as well. 
xvi The new law allows firms to negotiate their own EWC format with employee representatives up until September 
1996, after which time firms are required to begin such negotiations. In case such negotiations should fail, 
employee representatives can demand implementation based on a default model appended to the new legislation. 
See European Industrial Relations Review 251, December 1994: 27-32 for the text of Council Directive 94/45/EC. An 
estimated 1200-1300 firms will be required to establish Euroworks councils under the new legislation {EIRR 247, 
August 1994: 3-4; Economist, 2 December 1995: 73). 
xvii Under fiscal duress, the Commission originally provided no funding for EWCs in its 1993 budget. The funds were 
not only restored but increased as a demand from the labour-sympathetic European Parliament, which 
demonstrates perhaps that Parliament is not quite as irrelevant as many assume. 
xviii BR Kontakt, VW General Works Council newsletter, July 1991: 4; European Industrial Relations Review 202, 
November 1990: 3; Fuchs et al. (1991). 
xix BR Kontakt, July 1991: 4. Note that as recession deepened and VW decided to close a plant in Spain, debate 
increased and cooperation became more difficult between German and Spanish EWC members. Such conflicts of 
interest, however, have not undermined the expansion of cross-national information exchange and collaboration 
under the auspices of the EWC (Mertens, 1994). 
xx It is perhaps no coincidence that these two European MNCs are American owned. Nonetheless, the outcomes of 
attempts to establish EWCs at these companies are not atypical. 
xxi Industrial Relations Europe, December 1994: 3. 
xxii See European Industrial Relations Review 256, May 1995: 18. 
xxiii For a useful perspective on this possibility, see Mahnkopf and Altvater (1995). 
